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I.
Professor Gidon Gottlieb's book' is an attempt to make clear the
logic of legal reasoning, and then to exhibit the implications of
that logic for a number of problems in the philosophy of law. The
contents of the book are interesting, even though the writing is poor
and the text full of misprints; and the point of view expressed is
important, even though it is not new in its basic themes. Regarding
certain issues of jurisprudence, Gottlieb suggests that he subscribes
to neither legal positivism nor a natural law philosophy, indicating
that he is reaching for an alternative to them. However, his theory of
legal reasoning, which is prior to his views on those issues, appears
either to assume or to be compatible with familiar positivist themes,
and for this reason I have found it helpful more often than not
to view Gottlieb's position as a development of positivism rather than
as an alternative to it. In any event, the position is sophisticated and
for the most part carefully worked out, and therein lies the interest
of Gottlieb's work.
In what follows I consider Gottlieb's view of legal reasoning first,
since it governs all else. Then I discuss his treatments of the relation
of law and morality and of the nature of decision-making in an in-
stitution like the United States Supreme Court, topics which exhibit
fairly well how Gottlieb intends his account of legal reasoning to be
utilized. He gives attention to other problems of jurisprudence, of
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course, and often in instructive ways, but I will not take space to con-
sider them here.
II.
Gottlieb devotes about half his text to the task of characterizing
"legal rationality," a discussion which leans heavily upon recent phil-
osophy of mind, meaning and language, especially as that body of
theory has centered around the work of Wittgenstein in the Philosoph-
ical Investigations.2 In general, reasoning in legal contexts is said
to belong to the genus "reasoning with rules," as does reasoning in
moral and aesthetic contexts; and an adequate account of it will re-
quire a listing of what Gottlieb calls the "necessary ingredients" of
such reasoning, together with a description of how these ingredients
are deployed by those who engage in it to provide decisions for human
action. Among the distinguishable ingredients of reasoning with rules,
Gottlieb lists: (a) facts on record, (b) preexisting rules or precedents,
(c) the processes of inferring (which include selecting "material" facts
from the facts available and proceeding from material facts to a con-
clusion), (d) the statement or formulation of the inferences drawn,
(e) the "enunciation" of the rules justifying the inferences, (f) the
decision or verdict itself, (g) the consequences of the decision for the
parties directly involved, (h) the foreseeable applications of the enun-
ciated rule, with their consequences, and (i) the purposes, ends, and
goals of the preexisting rules, together with the purposes that com-
pete with them, and the different weights they may be assigned 3
As the size of this catalog suggests, reasoning with rules is a complex
matter for Gottlieb. The theorist's jobs of showing how these ingre-
dients are related and of describing the patterns of thought that con-
stitute rule-guided reasoning are accordingly multi-faceted. Gottlieb
carries out these tasks more in the manner of a survey of some recent
philosophical literature than a presentation of arguments for the views
he favors. As a survey it suffers from unevenness regarding the degree
of background familiarity with philosophical problems the reader is
presumed to bring to the subject.
Two points seem to govern Gottlieb's treatment of reasoning with
rules, and therefore to control his approach to jurisprudential prob-
lems. The first of these is an acceptance of a basic distinction between
2. L. WrrTNsirmN, PmlosoPIc,,L INVESMTIONS (G. Anscombe trnsl. 1953).
S. Gormu 77. 170-71.
791
The Yale Law Journal
"fact" and "value,"4 such that reasoning with rules is construed as a
way (but not the only way) of moving from what is given to what is to
be done: specifically, it is that way which proceeds by means of "infer-
ence-guiding devices" (rules) leading to decisions.' The second point is
that there is a conceptual link between rules and purposes such that
the inference-guiding devices which carry us from facts to decisions can
themselves be objects of considered preference, and thus intelligent
choice, by reference to purposes. These points are not argued for in
any independent way by Gottlieb, even though they are reflected in
many of the jurisprudential views he later presents.7 For that reason
the characterization of rule-guided reasoning that rests on them may
not be of special interest to moral philosophers except for the detail in
which it is set out.8 This of course does not prevent his use of the char-
acterization in treatments of jurisprudential issues from being of in-
terest to philosophers of law.
Aside from these philosophical commitments in Gottlieb's account,
he proffers a claim about reasoning with rules which his discussion
leaves confused. The claim is that reasoning with rules is "auton.
omous."9 Gottlieb's discussion allows two interpretations of the claim,
one of which seems misleading as well as unnecessary for his purposes,
while the other is probably correct but of less importance than Gottlieb
appears to attach to it.
According to the first interpretation, the claim of autonomy may
be construed as the view that reasoning with rules is one of several
"forms of reasoning," such as deductive reasoning, inductive reasoning,
4. See, e.g., id. 54.
5. Id. 37.
6. Id. 62, 106.
7. For a useful collection of recent materials concerning the first of these polnt--ln-
eluding some which suggest that the distinction between fact and value is not as firm
as Gottlieb assumes-see THE Is-OUGHT QUEsToN (W. Hudson ed. 1969). As regards the
second point, perhaps Gottlieb intends as support of a sort his remark that a "gratuitous"
rule, e.g., a sign in the middle of a pond saying, "Do not attach boats to this sign," is not
really a rule. GoTTuy 62.
8. One interesting feature of Gottlieb's characterization is that rules are to be dis-
tinguished from commands. Gorrumn 42, 100-1, 116. How the distinction is to be made
out is not completely clear from Gottlieb's discussion. His point is not that rules are
linked with purposes but commands are not. And it cannot be merely that rules Introduce
recurring patterns while commands are "addressed ad hominern" (id. 42), for commands
can introduce recurring patterns as well. His suggestion appears rather to be that
reception is different in the two cases, in that obedience is required of the recipient of
a command, whereas the recipient of a rule has an opening for appraisal and considera-
tion of purposes. Id. 115-16. The contrast is an interesting one, but it is perhaps not
sufficient as a ground of the distinction: if I command you to do x, and you proceed to
appraise such purposes as are involved either as or before you do x (or refuse to do V), it
is not plain that I have not commanded you to do x, or that you have not been com-
manded to do x.
9. Id. 28-32.
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"scientific" reasoning, etc., which stand as alternatives to each other.
On this account, the concept of rationality is pictured as a collection
of independent unit-activities, each with its own "logic" and internal
standards in terms of which it may be distinguished from other unit-
activities belonging to the general (collective) concept. Much in Gott-
lieb's discussion supports this interpretation. For example, he suggests
that concepts of validity are "field-dependent," i.e., dependent upon
"fields of argument," such as mathematics, judicial and moral decision-
making, perhaps aesthetics; and he comments in a quasi-historical way
on the "displacement of the analytic [i.e., deductive] ideal" as the
paradigm of rational activity.10
But the difficulties in this picture may be troublesome enough to
make it unattractive as a governing conception for the analysis of
legal and other "forms" of reasoning. In the first place, to say that
concepts of validity are field-dependent is to say that fields are prior to
concepts of validity. This, in turn, is to say that in order to under-
stand a specific concept of validity one must first understand the nature
of a given field. But what is it to understand the nature of a field?
Surely a major part of understanding "fields" is comprehending the
arguments appropriate to them, and thus the concepts of validity that
operate in them. That is, an understanding of these arguments and
concepts would appear to be constitutive of an understanding of these
fields, and not "dependent" upon them. If so, it cannot be supposed
that we may approach an understanding of legal rationality by somehow
first understanding law.
In the second place, the picture in question appears to warrant talk
about rationality wherever there exists a recognizable "field." Thus,
we are led to suppose that astrology as well as law, and cooking as well
as mathematics, have their appropriate concepts of validity, and hence
that we can exhibit their logics. This point is not by itself a difficulty,
of course, for in a muted sense of "logic" which refers to the fact that
a particular object of study exhibits patterns and structure, astrology
and cooking do indeed have their respective logics. The difficulty arises
when we recognize that ordinarily the task of exhibiting the concepts
of validity operating in a field is taken to be the task of making clear
not only the patterns of thought typical of that field but also what it is
about them that makes the field, so to speak, intellectually respectable.
Now, a general way of showing that a field is not intellectually
10. Id. 28-30.
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respectable is by showing that the patterns that characterize it do not
deserve confidence. And this may occasionally be done by showing that
the "inferences" sanctioned by the "logic" of that field are bogus.
To make out a case of this kind presupposes that there are unacceptable
as well as acceptable criteria of valid inferences and hence concepts of
rationality. Against this background, the difficulty in Gottlieb's picture
of field-dependent forms of reasoning is that the picture does not itself
provide a distinction between acceptable and unacceptable "logics."
Gottlieb recognizes this difficulty when he refers to the danger in the
"displacement of the analytic ideal" of an "unchecked proliferation of
new critical standards."' 1 What is not recognized is that the provision
of means for making the distinction in question requires a proposal
of criteria of acceptability for logics which is independent of the pic.
ture of alternative forms of reasoning. It may not be logically impossible
to supplement that picture with criteria of acceptability for some logics
over others. But, so far as justification is concerned, these criteria will
occupy a kind of limbo. They certainly will not derive from the picture
itself.' 2 In the end, the present interpretation of Gottlieb's claim that
legal reasoning is autonomous does not allow us to mark off the class
of rational activities within the much larger class of pattern-exhibiting
fields, and hence does not itself entitle us to view the pattern-exhibiting
field of law as a rational activity.
I will mention finally that this interpretation of Gottlieb's claim
implies that deduction, induction, and so forth, have no place in legal
reasoning, for they are to be viewed as independent forms of reasoning,
But Gottlieb's own text provides objections to this. In some places
he suggests that specimens of reasoning in legal contexts can be cast
into deductive forms,' 8 though it may be unhelpful for some purposes
to do so. And it seems clear that the general thrust of his account is
that rule-guided reasoning is a matter of matching up "material" facts
with the antecedents of rules, so that one can move by the rules to
decisions which instantiate the consequents of those rules. Deductive
reasoning, in short, is not the whole of legal reasoning, but nevertheless
11. Id. 80.
12. Gottlieb provides a very brief discussion and proposal of such criteria. Id. MR,
If my remarks are correct, the general point is that the picture of alternative forms of
reasoning must leave the source of such criteria (whatever they are) unclear, and their
credentials as "conditions of adequacy" suspect. At present I do not trust my under.
standing of the nature and source of the criteria which Gottlieb proposes enough to
discuss them specifically.
13. Id. 17, 166.
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it has a place in understanding both its structure and the operations
of those who engage in its practice.
This last point suggests a different interpretation of Gottlieb's claim
about autonomy, according to which the point of importance is that
the schemes of deductive inference-e.g., "p->g, p.'.q"-.do not provide
a complete account of the workings of legal reasoning. Before and
beyond the application of such schemes of inference are the tasks of
interpreting facts and consequences in such a way as to bring them
within the criteria of the variables specified in rules, of identifying
and determining the merits of regarding those criteria as linked in
various ways in the first place, and so forth.14 The value of Gottlieb's
view that there are "ingredients" of legal reasoning is that it suggests
that many constituent tasks of different kinds are involved in decision-
making in legal contexts. An illuminating characterization of legal
reasoning cannot contain simply a recital of schemes of deductive
inference, and legal reasoning may be said to be autonomous in the
sense that it is not reducible to those schemes. But it does not follow
that legal reasoning is autonomous in the sense that it is an independent
alternative to deductive reasoning.15
III.
I turn now to Gottlieb's treatments of two connected problems in
the philosophy of law: the problems of how law and morality are
related, and of how "constitutional adjudication," as practiced by the
United States Supreme Court, is to be understood. The interest of
Gottlieb's treatment of the first of these problems is his claim, to be
discussed in this section, to have escaped the approaches characteristic
of positivism and natural law philosophy. Both treatments exhibit a
way in which, as he admits, his general theory is incomplete, and
I will comment upon the importance of this incompleteness in the
last section of this review.
The point of departure for Gottlieb's account of the relation of law
14, Id. 17, 160.
15. One of Gottlieb's purposes in his discussion of the logic of legal reasoning is to
provide an objection to "mechanical interpretation of rules." Id. 45-46, 126. But it is not
necessary to hold that legal reasoning is autonomous in the sense of an independent
alternative ta deductive reasoning to provide such an objection. The view that legal
reasoning involves but is not reducible to deductive reasoning can provide a basis for
an objection to mechanical interpretation, though perhaps not a sufficient basis, de-
pending upon what conception of that form of interpretation is at issue.
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and morality is Professor H. L. A. Hart's treatment of the "rival"
positivist and natural law approaches to that relation:10
Hart impliedly suggests that there is no third option and that one
must adopt either of these two theories. He pointed out that under
the positivistic view there is no logical restriction on the content
of the rule of recognition which could theoretically provide that
laws should cease to be regarded as such should they prove to be
morally objectionable. The objection to such a theoretical arrange-
ment would be, he felt, not logic but the gross indeterminacy of
such a criterion of legal validity.
Our objection to Hart's treatment of this subject is that his
dichotomy is artificial and that it leaves no room for a different
mode of dealing with legislation which meets the formal tests of
the rule of recognition of a system, and which is at the same time
fundamentally outrageous to the moral sense of a community."
Before attempting to understand what "different mode" of dealing
with legislation Gottlieb has in mind, we should recall some themes
of the positions he wishes to move away from, as well as the issue
between them. On the side of positivism, the above passage suggests
that among those themes will be (1) that law and morality are distinct,
in the sense that the criteria of a rule's being a legal rule are not
the same as the criteria of a rule's being a moral rule, and (2) that
it is not logically impossible for a morally objectionable rule to meet
the criteria of a legal rule. Gottlieb does not describe the contents
of a natural-law position, other than to mention that such a position
"excludes from 'law' all such morally offensive rules."1 8
The main issue between positivism and a natural law position, as
regards the relation between law and morality, might be expressed in
the following way. Suppose a rule r meets the formal tests by which
any rule becomes a part of a community's legal system, i.e., it has the
community's "rule of recognition," in Hart's phrase, applied to it.
But suppose r is also morally outrageous to many members of the
community, including many members of its judiciary. I take it that
the typical recommendation of natural law theory in such circumstances
is that the proper course for those who object to r is for them to argue
that r is not a law, on the ground that it is morally objectionable,
And the typical recommendation of positivism is for those who object
16. See H.L.A. HART, TnE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961). See also Hart, Positivism and the
Separation of Law and Morals, -71 HARv. L. REV. 593 (1958) and Fuller, Positivism and
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to r to admit that r is a law, but then to take steps to show how r
is morally objectionable, so as to bring about efforts toward its reform
or abolition by citizens and resistance to it by members of the judiciary.
The issue, then, concerns not whether it is legitimate to bring moral
objections against rules, but whether such objections can have the
effect of denying the title of "law" to rules which fall under the rule
of recognition of the legal system.
Against this background, what is the "different mode of dealing with
legislation" that Gottlieb has in mind? He writes:
Essentially under the alternative excluded by Hart's dichotomy
we would consider as ineffective the enactment of laws which are
fundamentally inimical to the purposes and goals promoted by the
rules of recognition and other fundamental legal rules of the
system.19
That is, the recommended course is for those who object to r to argue
that r is not a law, on the ground that it does violence in some basic
way to the purposes of the community's legal system. In accordance
with his view that there is a conceptual link between rules and purposes,
Gottlieb argues that
the application of the rule of recognition, like the application of
all other rules, cannot be made in disregard of the ends for which
it is designed. To apply.., the rule of recognition so as to allow
the introduction into the legal system of rules destructive of the
very ends and purposes which the rule of recognition is designed
to promote, would be a self-contradictory and, therefore, absurd
enterprise.2 0
Let me point to certain difficulties in Gottlieb's account. First, the
account does not provide an alternative to positivism and natural law
theory, so far as the status of a rejected rule is concerned. If the problem
is about whether r is to be characterized as a morally objectionable law
or as morally objectionable and therefore not a law, then Gottlieb's
account is not an alternative to the positions in question, but is located
on the side of natural law theory. For when a rule is rejected in the
way Gottlieb proposes, it is rejected as failing to be a law.
More important, the account risks missing the issue between posi-
tivism and the theory of natural law. Since, on Gottlieb's view, there is a
conceptual connection between rules and purposes, then, when r is
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rule of recognition, the logic of the rejection is that r does not meet
the criteria of being a legal rule in that system. That is, the candidate.
rule does not pass the test of the system's rule of recognition. But
positivism and natural-law theory both subsume this "mode of dealing
with legislation," and do not exclude it. The issue between them is
posterior to it. That issue only arises when it is agreed that r has met
the "formal" criteria of being a legal rule, for only then would it be
problematic whether or not r's being morally objectionable is a
consideration which counts-logically retroactively, as it were-a
denying r the title of "law."21
Gottlieb's text indicates that he might reply to this line of criticism
by arguing that the mode of dealing with legislation he has in mind
is not a "moral" mode at all:
Morality is . .. not directly relevant here. The rationality of
purposive interpretation is logically quite neutral as to the contents
of the rules and the nature of their purpose. It merely requires
that interpretation is integrated with, rather than truncated from,
the body of purposes it is supposed to serve. The rationality of this
kind of interpretation is largely a matter of its consistency32
Perhaps this point about moral neutrality makes Gottlieb believe he
has escaped the dichotomy of positivism and natural law theory. But I
do not see that he provides arguments of the right sort either to sup-
port the point itself, or to show how the point is of a kind to permit
an escape from the dichotomy.
Surely a paradigm of a moral objection to a rule is one which shows
how it violates or fails to serve the "moral ends and purposes" of a
community, as they may be incorporated "into formal constitutional
texts and declarations of a legal nature."23 The member of a community
who raises these purposes against the introduction of a rule is framing
a case of a familiar kind for regarding the rule as morally objectionable.
There may of course be other ways of bringing a moral objection
against a rule, and there may be certain purposes of a community
which are not proper objects of appraisal as either moral or immoral.
But both positivist and natural law theories are, by themselves, quiet
on these subjects, in the sense that there are different moral theories
21. It may be objected that I have mislocated the issue, and that the natural law
theorist is really proposing that moral criteria be included among the "formal" criteria
of r's being a legal rule. Perhaps so. But in that case I do not see how to distinguish the
natural law position from Gottlieb's position, which reinforces the thought that Gottlieb
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about them, such as utilitarianism, Kantianism, etc., which each may
be compatible with. The effect of this, for Gottlieb's argument, is to
place upon him the burden of showing what is to count as a moral ob-
jection and what is not, and what purposes are proper objects of moral
appraisal and what are not. He does not discharge this burden, and in
the absence of an account which does, the reason why we must suppose
that "purposive interpretation" is morally neutral remains obscure.
It may be granted that such interpretation is itself independent of
specific purposes and goals of systems. But this does not make the
mode of dealing with legislation, whereby a system's moral ends and
purposes are brought against a rule's being regarded as a law, a morally
neutralmode.
This brings me to a final point concerning Gottlieb's view which
is independent of how far it is an alternative to positivism and natural
law theory, or whether it misses the issue between those views, or
whether it can be subsumed by either of them. Gottlieb speaks in
various ways about introducing rules into a system which go against
its purposes: in places he describes the introduction of such rules as
"logically absurd;" in other places as "ineffective;" in other places as
"fundamentally inimical" to the system's ends. Without attempting to
sort out these modalities, one must notice that the general effect is to
place in jeopardy the possibility of a legal system's reforming itself.
Legal systems promote many ends, and some of them may not have
the moral credentials of others. Suppose that a system promotes Equality
by, among other things, presuming that citizens are equal before the
law, but that it also promotes the interests of a certain segment of the
community by, among other things, restricting the notion of "citizen"
to apply to members of a certain class or race. We might hope that
members of the judiciary, and the people generally, would resist pieces
of legislation that were in accord with the second as well as the first
of these ends. They could not find aid for their efforts at resistance in
Gottlieb's mode of purposive interpretation. What we might want to
see happen is precisely the introduction of rules which violate the
second end, and, in fact, eliminate that end from the body of purposes
and goals of the system. That is, we might want to see the community
move toward an enlargement of the sphere within which it follows
principles associated with the ideal of Equality, by removing an artifi-
cial restriction on the scope of application of those principles. If Gott-
lieb's purposive interpretation is the only mode available, then the
legal system loses an important way of reforming itself. If it is not the
only mode available, then, as I read Gottlieb's text, his account does
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not make clear what the others are, nor how they rank in importance
with purposive interpretation.
IV.
But how problematic the prospects for the internal reform of a legal
system are made by Gottlieb's view is not finally determinable by in-
vestigation of the text under review. For the character of those pros-
pects will depend ultimately upon views about the morality of ends and
purposes that Gottlieb does not develop in the present text, but pro.
poses "to explore in another work." 24 There is usually nothing objec-
tionable in a theorist's setting limits upon his inquiry, so long as those
limits do not implicitly beg the questions he sets out to answer. In
the present case, however, what is set outside the inquiry is of enough
importance to make the absence of discussion of it pose a threat to
certain results of the inquiry. Let me show this by a brief discussion
of Gottlieb's treatment of constitutional adjudication in the Supreme
Court.
The problem of constitutional adjudication is set out by Gottlieb
in the form of a dilemma:
The Supreme Court is ... torn between the conflicting require.
ments that its appraisal of competing values and interests be
principled and based upon reason, a requirement which cannot be
met according to some contemporary philosophical traditions, and
...the requirement that it refrain from turning into law the
shifting value preferences of the transient court majorities sub-
stituting their private preferences for those of elected legislators.
Viewed in this perspective the critical question for constitutional
adjudication is whether courts have the possibility to avoid this
dilemma; whether they can avoid deciding issues involving con-
flicting values otherwise than on the basis of subjective personal
preferences, on some sort of principled basis. In other words, is
the dichotomy of "balancing" versus "principled' decision-making
inescapable? 25
Gottlieb's solution of this problem rests on the key notion of "balancing
guided by preferred values" 26 and requires that the "preferredness"
(as Gottlieb terms it) have its source outside the subjective preferences
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tion. In particular, the guiding preferred values should not be those
of judges reacting to cases before them, but those which Gottlieb
calls "preferred balances," struck by the Framers of the Constitution, -
plus those, which he calls "indications of exemplary choices between
values" endorsed in "acts of national commitment," such as are to be
found in documents like the Universal Declaration of the Rights of
Man and the United Nations Charter, and which may be thought of as
"incorporated into the law of the land under the Supremacy Clause."23
The advantages of this solution, Gottlieb suggests, are that preferredness
of this kind "involves an element of guidance and principle which can
remove the decision from the unfettered discretion of the deciding
judge," and it thus "provides a fount of principle and authority which
the ad hoc balancing of values assigned equal weight denies."2 0 In sum:
When judicial reasoning is committed to follow all available au-
thority and guidance it is not faced with the awesome task of
constituting its own values. This is the task of the Founders,
of the Framers, not the task of judges. When there is readiness
to act upon someone else's balancing, much of the anxiety and
agony of decision is removed. In reasoning guided by rules there
is therefore a way of being principled without legislating one's own
preferences into law.30
My comment on Gottlieb's solution here is not that it is wrong.
It is rather that I cannot tell whether it is right or wrong. The reason
is that a solution of Gottlieb's sort raises a large number of questions,
many of which are serious enough to make it useless, in the absence
of a systematic discussion of them, which Gottlieb does not provide,
to venture an appraisal of the solution. The questions raised are roughly
of two kinds. They concern, first, the qualifications that must accompany
the solution, e.g., about those cases for which preferred balances have
not been established or are unclear, and about those conditions under
which established preferred balances may legitimately be disregarded.3'
27. 'Tor example.. . the interest in the safeguard of internal order by government
regulation has been subordinated by the Framers to the interest in the safeguard of the
freedom of speech." Id. 150.
28. Id. 148-49, 152.
29. Id. 150.
50. Id. 151.
31. Gottlieb remarks that in cases of the former kind, "the dilemma is then hard
indeed," id. 151, which is perhaps true though unhelpful Regarding conditions of the
latter sort, he suggests that established preferred balances may be disregarded in "ex-
treme circumstances"--" '[e]xtreme' that is with respect to the ovenvhelming impact which
failure to disregard the rule would have on a less favored value, which although less
favored, is nonetheless not entirely disregarded." Id. 150. The notion of "overwhelming
impact" seems as unhelpful in this context as the notion of "extreme circumstances." And
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And, second, they concern matters of justification that, if treated in ap-
propriate detail, would require a full-blown moral theory. I will close
with some remarks about questions of the latter sort that are raised by
Gottlieb's solution, but left undiscussed in the present text, with the
effect, I am suggesting, that his solution cannot be appraised.
I mentioned earlier that Gottlieb's view of "purposive interpretation"
jeopardizes the possibility of a legal system's reforming itself. In a sim-
ilar way his present doctrine of constitutional adjudication is compat-
ible, so far as the present text is concerned, with morally objectionable
"established preferred balances." In contrast, the impression I have re-
ceived from Gottlieb's use of examples throughout his book is that he
believes there to be some balances among competing or conflicting
values which deserve preference over others. What his present account
lacks, and what is promised in another work, is a theory which either
sets out criteria of "preferredness," or in some other way lets us see how
and why certain balances are to be preferred over others.
In the absence of such a theory, the idea that the preferences of judges
engaged in adjudication should be set aside in favor of the balances
struck by the Framers, plus those expressed in certain other documents
the community has endorsed,32 is not itself compelling. I am not
denying that the idea can be made compelling, but pointing out that
arguments that might do so are not attempted in Gottlieb's text,
What, after all, sanctions the move from "preferred balancings" to
"Framers' preferred balancings"? The purposes of the Framers as
expressed in the Constitution and commented upon in other documents
can be as much compromised as those of others; The Federalist makes
such a general point,3 and the three-fifths rule in the Constitution
provides a specific example. Besides, the force of Gottlieb's earlier
chapters was to show how the conceptual link between rules and pur.
poses makes rules proper objects of intelligent choice and considered
Gottlieb's attempt to illustrate his point-by remarking that the preferred balance In
favor of freedom of speech in the Bill of Rights "is such that it would tax the imagina-
tion to conceive of any speech, as distinct from conduct, which could lead to such an
overwhelming and immediate threat to internal security as to warrant regulation," id.
150-deserves the reply that the point depends on whose imagination is involved, and,
more seriously, on how the distinction between speech and conduct is made out.
32. The fact that Gottlieb allows preferred balancinFs that might be found in docu-
ments other than a community's constitution is interesting in its own right. On the one
hand, it brings up the problem, also left undiscussed in the text, of when something Is
to count as a source of "authoritative balancing," id. 149, for a community. On the otlier
hand, it shows that Gottlieb does not view the preferred balancings of the Framers as
exhaustive of the class of such balancings, and hence suggests that something other than
those preferences stands as a criterion for them.
33. Tam FEr ESTAr No. 54 (Hamilton).
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preference. It is precisely this view which cieates an extra need for
arguments to support the claimed priority of the preferred balancings
of the Framers in the present context.
Finally, Gottlieb claims that by moving from the preferences of
engaged judges to those of the Framers plus others endorsed by the
community, we achieve "the possibility of fairness and impartiality."34
In the absence of a justificatory theory of preferred balancings, this
claim can only be puzzling. How is it that a move from the balances
of values that a judge or judges might deem preferred to those expressed
in certain documents drawn up by Framers or others is a move toward
even the possibility of impartiality? One might suppose that it would
depend on how closely and how often the balances of either party
meet the criteria of moral preferredness, whatever they are. Gottlieb's
account seems to deny, without discussion, an important tradition of
moral thought, according to which impartiality may indeed require the
setting aside of one's own values, but not merely to replace them with
the values of others, no matter how revered and estimable they may
be.35 I quoted Gottlieb above as saying that "when there is readiness
to act upon someone else's balancing, much of the anxiety and the agony
of decision is removed." This may be true enough in itself, but it
does not yet follow that the decision-making thus relieved is morally
tenable.
34. GOTLEB 153.
35. I have in mind the Kantian tradition. The most interesting recent formulation of
that tradition with which I am acquainted is the work of John Rawls. See Rawls,
Justice as Fairness, 67 Pn.. RFv. 164 (1958), revised and repinted in 2 PuLosopity,
Ponrrics, AND SocIErY 132 (P. Laslett & WV. Runcman eds. 1962); Rawls, Distributie
justice, in 3 PHILOSOPHY, PoLrrcs A'B SocrETY 58 (P. Laslett & W. Runciman eds. 1967).
I have discussed Raws's view in Contractualism and Moral Criticism, 23 RM. AftrA-
PHYSICS 85 (1969).
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